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Abstract
Most of the research on nonprofit governance is predominantly focused on board while the 
complexity of governance structure is overlooked. This study examines governance structure 
models of Czech national sport organizations (NSOs) as a representative of nonprofit sec-
tor. Qualitative research design was employed and document analysis was conducted. Results 
reveal substantially higher diversity in complexity in governance structure of NSOs in com-
parison to literature and the results lead to development of taxonomy of governance models 
of NSOs. Two grounds of the diversity were analysed. First, governance structure models are 
influenced by continental (two-tier) corporate governance model and Anglo-Saxon (one-tier) 
governance model. Second, governance structure models vary in number of electoral levels 
between an individual member and an NSO general meeting. The developed models are dis-
cussed and links to structural variables analysed.
Key words
governance structure, structure complexity, two-tier governance, national sport organiza-
tions, governance model, strong executive
Introduction and research questions
Governance research attracts attention of researchers both in corporate and in nonprofit 
sector and the importance of governance issues is perceived in sport management as well. For 
example, “Governance of sport(s)” is one of the integral topical sessions of European Asso-
ciation of Sport Management Conference. Governance research is predominantly focused on 
board (Cornforth, 2012, Speckbacher, 2008). Although board is a central element of good gov-
ernance acknowledged by scholars (Brown, 2005, Ferkins and Shilbury, 2012, Ferkins, Shil-
bury and McDonald, 2009, Hoye and Cuskelly, 2007, Inglis, 1997, Yeh and Taylor, 2008) and 
by codes of good governance (Australian Sports Commission, 2005, Sport and Recreation Al-
liance, 2011), other aspects of nonprofit governance have been overlooked (Cornforth, 2012). 
One of the overlooked aspects is governance structure of sport organizations. As Ferkins and 
Shilbury (2010) conclude, governance structure is an under-researched area not only in sport 
but in nonprofit sector generally. Especially, there is a dearth of studies on designs of govern-
ance structure. 
The National sport organizations (NSOs) play a significant role for sport in every country. 
They are the highest authorities representing any particular sport in their countries with large 
impact. For example, 73 NSOs associated with Czech Sport Association in the Czech Republic 
have membership almost 1.5 million (Czech Sport Association, 2013a) what makes over 15% 
of Czech population. NSOs are responsible for the rules of a particular sport, state sport rep-
resentation, redistribution of public resources to sport, and the development of sport. The role 
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of NSOs slightly differs in particular countries but their governance structure is the same in all 
countries (Hums and MacLean, 2009). Moreover, NSOs are an example of dispersed or mu-
tual ownership which is typical for nonprofit sector and also for some professional sport clubs 
(Ward, Scanlon and Hines, 2012). For this reasons, NSOs can be perceived as an appropriate 
representative on nonprofit sector.
Governance structure of nonprofit organizations is generally described in accordance with 
Anglo-Saxon governance model and the same model is recommended for sport organizations. 
Governance structure of a nonprofit sport organization is considered as a system of the gen-
eral meeting or the Council, the board and one or more sub-committees (Hoye and Cuskelly, 
2007). Having the legal form of “citizen’s associations”, Czech NSOs are basically governed by 
the law which was changed last year. Previously citizen’s associations had been governed by the 
Act on Association of Citizens 83/1990. Now, citizen’s associations are obliged to change the 
legal form to “societies” and they are regulated by a particular part of the Civil Code 89/2012. 
However, the impact of the change is rather of formal consequences. The governance structure 
has not been regulated very strictly and there are only two compulsory bodies of governance 
structure: a statutory body (which can be interpreted as board) and a collective body (which 
can be interpreted as a general meeting). Moreover, it is even possible that these two bodies 
may be represented by a single body with all powers assigned (Czech Olympic Committee, 
2013) and hence, such regulation allows cases of governance duality which is generally con-
sidered as unwanted (Elsayed, 2007). Given these points, the governance structure is fully at 
NSOs discretion and is influenced by nonprofit and corporate governance models. 
The objective of the paper is to analyse complexity of governance structure of Czech NSOs, 
to develop the taxonomy of governance structure models employed by Czech NSOs, and to 
identify cases where the model of governance structure does not comply with the principles 
of good governance. This objective is analysed in accordance with elementary dimension of 
governance structure: horizontal and vertical complexity (Slack and Parent, 2006). Horizontal 
complexity is used to analyse reflection of governance systems (Anglo-Saxon or continental) 
into implementation of one-tier or two-tier models. Vertical complexity of NSOs’ governance 
structure derives numbers of electoral levels between an individual member of a particular 
NSO and the general meeting of the NSO. Structural determinants linked to the governance 
model are examined next. In addition, cases where governance is not in correspondence with 
principles of good governance are identified. 
Governance structure of NSOs
Despite the lack of studies has been noticed in many papers, there has not been done much 
research in the area of governance structure. The most significant work was done in Can-
ada where Canadian NSOs went through the transformation from amateur to professional 
organizations. Frisby (1986) concluded that numbers of paid staff and numbers of special 
committees were positively correlated with ability to acquire financial resources, particularly 
government subsidies. Or generally, more complex the NSOs were larger and acquired more 
financial resources. However, the causality is unclear. Kikulis et al. (1992) developed a struc-
tural design archetypes based on cultural values and organizational structure. They identified 
three elementary archetypes. First, kitchen table archetype is based on non-formal roles and 
on interest and loyalty of volunteer staff, few rules, little planning and decision-making based 
on volunteers. Boardroom archetype has more committees and rules, an organization may be 
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operated by professional staff but still, decisions are made by volunteer board. Third archetype 
is Executive office with many formal roles, rules and programs and the decisions are made by 
professional staff. Again, complexity was linked to size and professionalism. Recent studies on 
governance structure of NSOs do not deal with governance structure models but focus its at-
tention on compliance of governance with codes of good governance (Chappelet and Mrkon-
jic, 2013, Mrkonjic, 2013) or on particular principles such democracy (Enjolras and Waldahl, 
2010). This paper covers the gap in knowledge of NSO and nonprofit governance, particularly 
through examination of elements of organizational structure.
There is no universal framework how to analyse or describe governance structure. In gen-
eral, governance structure is a part of organizational structure and thus, elementary dimension 
of organizational structure may be applied. Organizational structure generally analysed or de-
scribed through elementary three dimensions: complexity, centralization and formalization 
(Daft, 2010, Robbins and Coulter, 2004, Slack and Parent, 2006). The design of governance 
structure can be described through the dimension of complexity. Complexity is the most ap-
parent, yet least researched feature of any organizational structure. “Complexity is concerned 
with the extent to which a sport organization is differentiated” (Slack and Parent, 2006, p. 60) 
and complexity may occur horizontally and vertically. 
Horizontal complexity refers to task differentiation and departmentalization. The differ-
ence between one-tier and two-tier governance model can be described along with horizontal 
complexity. Governance in the Czech Republic has developed under influence of two govern-
ance models. The first system is two-tier governance model (or sometimes dual board system) 
which is characterized by separation of the supervisory board and the executive board (Jung-
mann, 2006). The two-tier model is traditionally employed in Germany, and some European 
countries are influenced by this model (e.g. Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Denmark). 
Corporate governance in the Czech Republic is based on the continental model of corporate 
governance including two-tier board system (Klírová, 2001, Malý, Theodor and Peklo, 2002, 
Růčková, 2008). The two-tier governance model is quite rare in nonprofit organizations and 
the research on two-tier governance system is very limited. Two-tier governance model is 
used by Taiwanese NSOs and the impact was examined by Yeh, Taylor and Hoye (2009). They 
concluded that two-tier governance model helps to distinguish managerial functions of the 
executive board from monitoring functions of the supervisory board. In their later study (Yeh, 
Hoye and Taylor, 2011), they revealed that boards roles are linked to the strategic orientation 
of such organizations. 
Vertical complexity refers to number of levels in an organization. Higher vertical complexity 
is usually prevalent at larger organizations and the more complex is the organization, the more 
problems with communication, coordination and supervision may occur (Slack and Parent, 
2006). Research confirms that the vertical complexity is linked with professionalism of the 
management (Kikulis, 2000) and vertical complexity grows together size of an organization 
(Amis, Slack and Hinings, 2002, Kikulis et al., 1989). Also the growing probability of a con-
flict in an organization caused by higher complexity was confirmed (Amis, Slack and Berrett, 
1995). All previous studies were conducted during the transformation in Canada in 1990s, and 
thus the transformation of sport in the Czech Republic makes an opportunity to revise these 
conclusions or, to bring new findings. 
The model of governance structure is vital because of the principal – agent problem. Princi-
pal is usually represented by members in NSOs, and agent is a board member or an appointed 
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executive member. Thus, NSOs are distinguished by dispersed form of ownership. According 
to Jensen and Fuller (2002) members should hold the rights to ratify initiatives and key deci-
sions of managers (ratification rights) and the rights to measure, evaluate, and reward or pun-
ish performance of managers (monitoring rights). Such situation is considered to be optimal 
and termed as effective governance while the loss of monitoring rights is termed as strong 
executive (Král et al., 2012). The case of strong executive may lead to misuse of power and was 
cause of corporate scandals such Enron or WorldCom which drew attention to corporate gov-
ernance (Schnackenberg and Tomlinson, 2014). Thus, good governance structure can prevent 
from corporate scandals and from misuse of power.
Even Czech sport has encountered the situation where strong executive led to a corporate 
scandal and this scandal was connected with Czech NSOs, specifically with a company gov-
erned by Czech NSOs. Czech NSOs had been owners of the largest lottery company Sazka 
until 2011 when Sazka was declared bankrupt and subsequently taken over by private inves-
tors. Thus, Czech NSOs lost about 13% of its revenues and the bankruptcy of Sazka is consid-
ered to be the most significant milestone for Czech sport in the last 20 years (Numerato and 
Flemr, 2013). Analysis of the causes of the bankruptcy was difficult because of low governance 
transparency of Sazka that disabled to get relevant governance documents. However, strong 
executive was revealed as a main cause behind. The board failed to ensure top-level control 
mechanism, and the CEO Aleš Hušák dominated not only the company but also command-
ed the board. For example, members of board had no notion of CEO’s remuneration which 
was obviously excessive, even in comparison with the best top managers’ remuneration (Aon 
Hewitt, 2011, Král, 2012). As a result, Czech NSOs lost the cash cow securing revenues over 40 
million EUR because they were not able to express their monitoring rights. 
Not only large organizations encounter strong executive. On the other side of the spectrum 
with regards to size of an organization, there are grassroots organizations. Grassroots organi-
zations are defined as “essentially local-scoped and voluntary organizations” (Smith, 2000, 
p. 7) and they are represented by single sport clubs. Previous research in the Czech Republic 
brought evidence that grassroots sport organizations are endangered by strong executive as 
well. The cause was identified rather in lack of interest of club members in governance than 
in governance structure itself (Král et al., 2010). So far, there was little research done either 
on general governance system or on grassroots association, and there is a gap in knowledge 
of governance of NSOs at all. Thus, this paper sheds light on governance of individual NSOs. 
Methodology
Qualitative research design was employed what reflects exploratory nature of the research and 
nature of data required (Edwards and Skinner, 2009, Patton, 2002, Tracy, 2013). The research 
sample comprised NSOs affiliated with the Czech Union of Sport (CUS). CUS is the largest gov-
erning body in the Czech Republic and it associates 74 NSOs what represents the majority of 
Czech NSOs. Particularly, CUS associates 35 Olympic and 39 non-Olympic sport NSOs. (Note: 
It is important to mention that the name of this umbrella association had been formerly Czech 
Sport Association (CSA) and the name was changed during the research process. Thus, the links 
contain CSA in cases where the data were acquired from the former CSA documents while CUS 
is used as a general name for the umbrella association). Five of the NSOs were excluded from the 
research sample because they did not meet the criteria of a standard NSO (Hums and MacLean, 
2009). Mountain Rescue Association of the Czech Republic, Czech Association of Recreational 
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Sport, Czech University Sport Association and Union of Handicapped Athletes did not meet the 
criteria of representing an individual sport or group of sports. Another excluded NSO was Czech 
Yoga Association which does not organize any competitions. Two other NSOs were excluded 
because they became members during the research process (Czech Cheer Association and Czech 
Association for Sport for All). In the end, the sample consisted of 67 NSOs. These 67 NSOs as-
sociated more than 1.4 million registered members. 
Secondary data were collected from the official web pages of the NSOs. The list of the NSOs 
was acquired through CSA webpages(Czech Sport Association, 2013b). Secondary data com-
prised all available NSOs governance documents such statutes, general meeting reports, an-
nual reports, board and executive member lists, financial documents and strategic documents. 
Because of heterogeneous structure of the webpages and different format of the documents, 
the web pages were scrutinized manually in all their sections. Other sources of data comprised 
annual report of CSA (Czech Sport Association, 2013a) to acquire official NSO membership, 
numbers of affiliated clubs, and official rankings of the Ministry of Youth, Education and Sport 
(Ministry of Education Youth and Sport, 2010) to get overall significance of NSOs. The overall 
significance incorporates apart from other things sport success, competition, popularity and 
membership and divides NSOs into three groups.
Data analysis was carried out in three steps. First of all, governance documents were exam-
ined and governance structure of each NSO was analysed. The purpose was to identify the gov-
ernance bodies, examine their authorities, and analyse the relations among them to describe 
the governance structure of the NSOs. Subsequently, selected variables were developed and 
operationalized for development of the taxonomy and further statistical analysis. The hori-
zontal complexity of governance structure was expressed through binomial variable (one-tier 
or two-tier board). The vertical complexity derived nominal variable based on the number of 
electoral governance levels. To demonstrate the coding of the variable, generally described 
governance model has a single electoral level because members of a club elect their representa-
tive who attends the general meeting of entire NSO. In the case where elected representatives 
of clubs attends general meeting of regional NSO first, and then these representatives elect 
their representatives who attends the general meeting of particular NSO, there are two elec-
toral levels. Finally, the taxonomy of governance models was developed upon those findings 
and statistical analysis was carried out to search for links between variables. The analysis was 
conducted in SPSS and used statistical hypothesis testing. 
Results
Data were acquired from 52 of 67 NSOs what makes 78% response rate. The sample com-
prised 31 Olympic NSOs and 21 NSOs representing non-Olympic sports what gives appropri-
ate representation of the population. The average membership of the sample NSOs was 25,018 
members, respectively 14,944 members excluding the Football Association of the Czech Re-
public which itself has over 30% of registered members all NSOs, and thus makes an extreme 
case regarding the membership. This fact was considered when testing hypotheses. The aver-
age membership of 15 NSOs whose documents were not available and thus were excluded 
from the research sample was 4,437 members what makes the results biased towards the NSOs 
with higher membership (t=2,144; p=0,036). However, the sample comprises NSOs with very 
low membership as well (e. g. Czech Republic Luge Sport with 450 members) and it is likely 
that the sample represents all possible governance models. When identifying governance bod-
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ies, it was necessary to analyse authorities of particular governing bodies since the terminol-
ogy is not very consistent. The highest governing body is called general meeting in 30 of 52 
NSOs. However, the main difference from remaining 22 NSOs is only in terminology (such 
as conference, presidium, parliament, assembly or congress) and the authorities of the high-
est governing body are very similar. Thus, the highest governing body is handled as general 
meeting at all NSOs. Competencies of general meetings at all NSOs comprise approval of stat-
utes, affiliation and expelling clubs and members, approval of annual reports, financial reports 
and voting statutory bodies. The meeting period of general meeting ranges from six months 
(Czech Archery Association) up to four years (nine NSOs). The average meeting period is 1.72 
years. The second common governing body is a statutory body which manage the operations 
of an NSO. Again, the terminology is not consistent but upon examination of authorities, it is 
possible to use a term board. The number of board members varies from three to fourteen with 
average of seven. The third governing body was a kind of supervisory board which was identi-
fied in ten NSOs. The responsibilities of such body are generally reduced from responsibilities 
of general meeting and the role is mostly in monitoring the board activities, approval of annual 
reports and approval of financial reports. 
The purpose of the horizontal complexity analysis was to identify implementation one or 
two-tier models and search for structural determinants linked to the one-tier or two-tier gov-
ernance model. Forty-two NSOs uses one-tier governance model while governance structure 
of 10 NSOs comprise another governance body in addition to general meeting and board. The 
only NSO (The Association of Czech Skiers) of those 10 NSOs could be classified as a typical 
continental model with supervisory board and executive board. The remaining nine NSOs can 
be classified as “The Czech governance model according to Anglo-Saxon pattern” (Růčková, 
2008, pp. 29–30). The additional governing body in these NSOs takes some responsibilities 
of the general meeting and makes important decisions between the regular general meetings. 
The additionally governing body meetings period is usually six months or a year what helps to 
bridge longer general meeting period. 
Analysis of structural differences between NSOs using one-tier or two-tier governance 
models revealed that two-tier governance model is employed by NSOs with more affiliated 
clubs (t=2.063; p= .044), with more paid staff (t=4.303; p= .000) and two-tier system is em-
ployed by more significant NSOs according to Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport assess-
ment (χ2=6,642; p=0,036) (Ministry of Education Youth and Sport, 2010). Another difference 
between NSOs using one-tier and two-tier governance model was identified in the period of 
general meetings. The period of general meeting of NSOs with one-tier governance system is 
1.57 years and the period of NSOs with two-tier governance system is 2.40 years what makes 
the period significantly different (t=2.190; p= .033). 
The vertical complexity analysis was focused on number of electoral levels between an in-
dividual member of a particular NSO and the general meeting of the NSO. In other words, 
this dimension states how many levels of election of representatives are between an individual 
member and general meeting of an NSO. The governance structure models were classified into 
four typical groups and four models were derived upon the findings. The developed taxonomy 
consists of four models: the direct model, the club model, the regional model and the mixed 
model. The taxonomy is pictured on figure one. 
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The first model is the direct model. In the direct model, each individual member has the 
right to vote at general meeting and a member can either attend general meeting personally 
or delegate his or her voting right to a club representative (who has a number of votes corre-
sponding to a number of members who had delegated him or her). This model is used by two 
NSOs (the Czech Mountaineering Association (CHS) and the Czech Federation of Bodybuild-
ing and Fitness (SKFCR)). Surprisingly, these are NSOs with membership higher than median 
(CHS 14,372 and SKFCR 8,762). Attendance at general meeting of The CHS was 25% of all 
members what points at interest of the members in governance. 
In the club model, the right to vote at NSO general meeting is delegated to a representa-
tive of a club affiliated with the NSO. This is the prevalent model employed by 27 NSO what 
makes 52% of the sample. Differences were identified in rules of nominations of delegates for 
general meeting. Most NSOs have a very simple rule and each club can nominate a single del-
egate (e. g. the Czech Golf Federation, the Czech Gymnastic Federation). Other NSOs deter-
mine the number of delegates according to membership (e. g. the Czech Archery Association). 
Fig. 1: Taxonomy of governance structure models according  
 to number of decision-making levels
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Moreover, as the reaction to problems with inflated membership, some NSOs determine the 
number of delegates from members who had paid the membership fee on time (e.g. the Czech 
Volleyball Federation) or even from members participating in competitions (e.g. the Czech 
Modern Pentathlon Association). In some cases, the numbers of delegates are determined and 
approved at general meeting (e.g. Czech Squash Association) or at board meeting (the Czech 
Korfball Federation). In sum, the club model is the most applied model with differences in 
determining the proportion of delegates of general meeting.
Third model adds one or more electoral level between a club and NSO general meeting, 
usually in the form of general meeting of district of regional NSO association. In such case, 
delegates of the club attend a regional general meeting where they elect delegates for a general 
meeting. Sometimes there are two additional electoral levels where district general meeting 
comes first and regional general meeting comes next or, there are general meetings of in-
dependent sections instead of general meetings of regional associations. Direct interaction 
between an individual member and a delegate of general meeting is not likely. Ten NSOs use 
this model. Although there are differences in determining numbers of delegates for a general 
meeting, the main feature of the model is a direct hierarchy of the electoral levels. 
The mixed model combines attributes of previous models and it is applied by 13 NSOs of the 
sample. This model is generally based on regional model and frequently assigns extra electoral 
rights either to large clubs or to members of governing bodies. Thus, a kind of prioritization of 
members is made to ensure extra electoral right to most impacted members. The most sophis-
ticated mixed model was revealed at the Football Association of the Czech Republic (FACR). 
The FACR general meeting comprise representatives of all clubs from the three highest leagues 
(66), elected representatives of the fourth league clubs (35 delegates of 80 clubs), representa-
tives of regional associations (14) and representatives of district associations (87). The mixed 
model is also used by some NSOs with independent sections such as Czech Canoe Union 
where delegates for the general meeting of the entire NSO are nominated at general meetings 
of individual sections which vary in the rules for nominations. 
Two examples where governance structure design does not comply with the good govern-
ance principles were identified. Both examples represent cases of strong executive but each of 
them is of unique nature. Governance model of the Czech Cycling Federation (CCF) allows 
the executive members to be in a majority on general meetings. The proportion of votes at 
general meeting assigns 28 votes to regional delegates, 28 votes to representatives of commit-
tees of 7 main disciplines (such as road, MTB, BMX, etc.) and a single vote to the president. 
However, there are no rules how to elect or appoint the representatives of the committees. 
Upon a thorough examination of the statutes (part X – Authorities of the president and part 
XII – Committees), the authority to appoint the representatives may be assigned to the pres-
ident. Thus, the president can have majority together with the representatives he appoints. 
Follow-up interviews with three members of the CCF confirm the exclusion of the members 
from decision-making and thus strong executive case. 
Another case of strong executive represents the governance model of the Czech Tennis Fed-
eration (CTF) because of exceptional authorities of a president. A president nominates mem-
bers of executive board who are approved by supervisory board subsequently. If a member is 
not approved by supervisory board the president should nominate another candidate. Thus, 
the president influences the board composition very strongly and supervisory board can only 
put a veto on undesirable candidate. Czech tennis has reached historical success in recent years 
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(victory both in Davis Cup and Fed Cup) and paradoxically, this model is linked with high 
performance of the organization. 
Finally, the statistical analysis was used to reveal links between the operationalized gov-
ernance variables (horizontal complexity – governance tiers, and vertical complexity – gov-
ernance levels in the table 1). Overall, NSOs with more members and more affiliated clubs 
have governance structure with more electoral levels. On the other hand, two-tier governance 
structure is not linked with membership but it is linked with NSO significance (combining 
sport success, competition and overall impact of the sport). On the other hand, there was no 
link to total revenues which approximate the size of an NSO as well. The results are presented 
in table 1.
Governance tiers Governance levels
Membership ***
Affiliated clubs ** ***
Number of staff ***
Total revenues
NSO significance ***
***  p ≤ 0,01
**    p ≤ 0,05
*      p ≤ 0,1
Tab. 1:  Relations between governance and structural variables
Discussion, limitations and conclusions
The confrontation of Anglo-Saxon one-tier governance model with continental two-tier 
governance model reflects in diversity of bodies comprised in governance structure of Czech 
NSOs. Generally, two-tier governance system is used by larger NSOs but the main reason for 
two-tier governance model is perceived ability to ensure monitoring of the board when the 
period of general meetings is longer than a year. In such case, the additional governance body 
takes the necessary responsibility for the monitoring of the board and for decisions which 
must be done at least once in a year (e. g. approval of annual report, income statement, budget 
and strategic plan). Fourteen of forty-two NSOs using one-tier model have the period of gen-
eral meetings longer than a year (even four years) and thus the monitoring of board activities 
is not sufficient. Czech NSOs admit the problem to secure sufficient attendance at general 
meeting and thus, “The Czech governance model” with an additional governance body is ad-
visable for all NSOs with longer period of general meetings. 
The second aspect of governance structure assessment brought the key results of the paper 
because the number of decision making levels in governance structure had not been examined 
yet. Generally, governance structure is usually described as the club model with just one elec-
toral level between a member and general meeting (Hoye and Cuskelly, 2007, National Coun-
cil for Voluntary Organisations, 2005). Nevertheless, 48% of NSOs have different governance 
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structure. Taxonomy of governance structure models was developed and the taxonomy iden-
tified three new models in addition to the club model which is generally used to describe 
nonprofit or NSO governance structure. The first of new models is the direct model. The direct 
model enables the best interaction between an individual member and NSO general meeting. 
Attendance at the Czech Mountaineering Association general meeting over 25% of all mem-
bers indicates high interest in governance which is clearly higher than in all other systems. The 
interest is probably encouraged by the direct ability to influence general meeting decision. The 
other two new models add one or more electoral level what has not been described in relevant 
literature yet.
This paper aims to open the discussion on governance structure and it brings several op-
tions for future research. Firstly, the results indicate that the direct model is linked to higher 
attendance at general meetings and it may be interpreted as higher interest in governance. 
Minutes from general meetings indicate that many NSOs are struggling to reach quorum what 
confirms previous findings on lack of interest in governance arising from grassroots organi-
zations. Further research on democracy in governance of NSO can focus on board – general 
meeting interaction and stakeholders’ perception of ability to influence general meeting de-
cisions. Such research may reveal how to encourage stakeholders to pay more attention to 
governance and may provide an answer how to raise interest in governance. Secondly, results 
did not find any link between the form of governance structure and effectiveness. Surprisingly, 
we the study identified the example of strong executive connected with high effectiveness of 
Czech Tennis Federation. On the other hand, executive control in hands of those at the top, 
leaving the membership with little real power is likely to undermine organizational legitimacy 
(Enjolras and Waldahl, 2010) and strong dependency on a single person brings high risk for 
any organization. Further studies on the link between governance structure and NSO effec-
tiveness or just board effectiveness could help to broaden under-researched topic of mecha-
nisms of effectiveness. 
This study has two limitations. Firstly, governance document were available from 52 of 67 
NSO and thus the distribution of the models can vary. Because the documents were acquired 
rather from larger NSOs there can be a bias in distribution towards more complex govern-
ance structure models. However, it is not likely that smaller NSOs would affect the developed 
taxonomy. Second limitation is perceived in low transparency of Czech NSOs which prevent-
ed the research from identifying the links between governance structure and effectiveness of 
NSOs. Therefore it is a recommended topic for further research. 
In conclusion, the study reveals that the governance structure models employed by Czech 
NSOs are diverse of what can be found in the literature and codes of good governance appli-
cable for nonprofit sector and, particularly codes for sport organizations. Two main grounds 
of such diversity were identified. Firstly, Anglo-Saxon one-tier governance model reflected in 
codes of good governance for nonprofit and sport organizations is confronted with continental 
two-tier governance model used in the Czech Republic by corporate sector. Hence, about one 
fifth of NSOs employ a governance model which is inspired by two-tier governance model. 
Those are generally larger NSOs and they use the advantages of the two-tier governance model 
to have longer period of general meetings. Secondly, NSOs governance structure models dif-
fer in number of decision making levels between an individual member and an NSO general 
meeting. This aspect led to development of taxonomy with four elementary governance struc-
ture models: the direct model, the club model, the regional model, and the mixed model. 
15
COMPLEXITY OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES: TAXONOMY OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE MODELS 
USED BY CZECH NATIONAL SPORT ORGANIZATIONS
CENTRAL EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT ∙ 2014 ∙ VOLUME 1 ∙ NUMBER 2
Moreover, two exceptions inherently enforcing strong executive were identified. The govern-
ance model is critical in ability of individual members to influence general meeting decisions. 
Thus, the more complex is the governance structure, the higher attention to communication 
and transparency is advisable because such complexity creates conditions for misuse of power.
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